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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
DETERMINANTS OF PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION:  
THE CASE OF SOUTH KOREA 
 
 By  
Kim Y. Lacey 
 
Public attitudes toward immigrants have been a topic that has received the most attention in 
many political and social science disciplines in recent years. There are various theoretical and 
empirical studies to explain what determines anti-immigration attitudes. In this study, I review 
the relevant literature and suggest various factors that influence the formation of the public’s 
immigration attitude in South Korea’s case.  
While most of the previous literature either focuses on just one or two determinants that are 
likely to have an impact on public attitudes toward immigration or chooses a political/economic 
approach over a social/cultural approach (or vice versa), I bring those determinants together to 
examine the overall impact. The aim of this study is to check the validity of some of the findings 
from the West in South Korea’s context and to fill the existing gap by testing the additional 
determinants that have not yet been studied in this country through a survey specifically designed 
for this paper.  
This study analyzes the correlation between each determinant and public’s attitude toward 
immigration by running a logit model based on the responses from 1,000 survey participants in 
South Korea. I find that satisfaction with one’s life has a positive correlation with a favorable 
attitude toward immigration in general, and the high correlation remained even when immigrants’ 
occupation or country of origin differed. The finding is significant because it has not been 
included as a determinant in most immigration-related studies. Some of the determinants already 
proven in other countries were also verified in this study, such as belief in racial/ethnic 
stereotypes, education level, and assimilation efforts. Furthermore, this study reveals how the 
public reacts differently when a specific immigrant group is suggested in comparison to when 
asked about “immigration” in general. 
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Introduction 
South Korea (hereafter referred to as simply “Korea”) saw a drastic increase in 
immigrants’1 inflow over just the past two decades. Accordingly, the governments at both 
national and local levels have been trying various policy measures, some successful while others 
not, in order to accommodate immigrants and to help them become members of society. 
However, despite the rapidly growing population of foreign residents, there is still a prevalent 
thought in Korean society that the nation is homogeneous with unique cultural and ethnic 
heritage. Some, while acknowledging this demographical change in society, insist that the 
incoming outsiders are a burden and disruption to Korea. This kind of opposition to immigration 
is anything but rare though, as the recent events around the world will attest, especially in 
relation to changing public attitudes toward immigration. Though many in the past used to 
believe that countries would evolve into one multicultural society as we became more civilized, 
that seems not to be the case. Strong nationalism is unexpectedly being resurrected and many 
countries that once had an open door immigration policy are now thinking of closing the door bit 
by bit, as we recently have confirmed by the result of the latest U.S. Presidential election, Brexit, 
as well as similar phenomena happening in many parts of Europe and Australia.   
Characteristics of Immigration to Korea 
According to the official data released by the Korean Immigration Service, there are more than 2 
million foreign nationals residing in Korea as of March, 2017 (Ministry of Justice, 2017). This 
number includes both short-term and long-term residents, such as students and trainees, white- 
and blue- collar workers, businessmen and investors, and “foreign brides.” The total population 
                                                 
1 In this paper, I use the term “immigrant” to include all foreign-born nationals who are residing in Korea regardless 
of their current citizenship status to accommodate the unique immigrant history of Korea. This is mainly to include 
many “foreign brides” who came to Korea for marriage and may have become naturalized but are often seen as 
outsiders, as I will explain more in detail later in this paper. 
of South Korea from the World Bank’s 2015 data is estimated to be around 50.62 million. In 
other words, around 4% of Korea’s total population is currently comprised of foreigners. This is 
quite a change considering the fact that in less than three decades, the percentage of foreigners 
grew from 0.1% to 4% of the nation’s population (Moon, 2015).  
Even though immigration restriction in Korea is considered to be not as strict compared to 
some other Asian countries, such as Japan, and despite the rapid growth in number of immigrants, 
the Korean government’s immigration policy is still highly selective if we look at most European 
or North American countries. Moreover, Korea’s social and economic problems – namely, 
urbanization, the education bubble2, and low fertility rate – gave rise to a unique immigrant 
composition as follows: 1) foreign workers with low skills3 and 2) foreign brides. Both groups 
mainly come from developing countries in Asia, such as Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). As for the workers, the Korean 
government is currently employing a system called “Employment Permit System (EPS)”, which 
was improved from a previous system called the Industrial and Technical Training Program 
(ITTP) established in 1992. ITTP had many problems of exploitation and abuse of foreign 
workers mainly because it was not a comprehensive government policy but rather a scheme 
managed by the Korean Federation of Small and Business (KFSB) to use cheaper foreign 
workers (Seol, 2005). Consequently, EPS was designed to improve foreign workers’ status from 
mere “trainees” to proper “employees” and to guarantee appropriate working conditions and 
rights for them. EPS allows workers from 15 Southeast and Central Asian countries to work in 
Korea for up to three years with a possible extension of two years (EPS, 2010). The program 
operates through bilateral government-to-government memoranda of understanding (MOU). The 
                                                 
2 Increase in education spending not contributing to the accumulation of human capital 
3 In Korean, the word (외국인 노동자) often implies low-skilled low-wage laborers mainly from China or Southeast 
Asian countries. 
vast majority of foreign workers in Korea, whether through EPS or not, work in the so-called 3D 
industries: dangerous, dirty, and difficult. Since Korea has one of the highest college graduate 
rates in the world, these kinds of low-paying and strenuous jobs face serious labor deficit, which 
is being partially mitigated by foreign workers. The significance of this will be examined further 
in a later part of the paper. 
The second unique group of immigrants, foreign brides, is made up by women mostly from 
developing countries. They come to Korea to get married to Korean men who cannot find a 
Korean wife. This kind of phenomenon has been happening due to the rapid urbanization in 
Korea from economic development since the 1970s. The men tend to be much older than the 
women and live in rural areas with mid- to lower- incomes. The foreign brides come to Korea 
through match-making agencies or brokers. As of 2015, there were over 300,000 foreign spouses 
in Korea, about 83% of which were foreign brides (Korean Statistical Informational Service, 
2015). Unlike other groups of immigrants who tend to be temporary and short-term residents, 
most foreign brides reside in Korea permanently, bear, and raise children in their respective 
multicultural families, so it is important to note their distinctive position in Korean society. Even 
though about 70 percent of total naturalizations were by foreign spouses between the early 2000s 
and 2012 (IOM, 2014), discrimination and domestic/social tensions are some of the obstacles 
they often face due to physical and cultural differences. The hardship caused by discrimination 
often trickles down to affect their children as well. 
There were numerous problems concerning foreign brides’ well-being especially in the 
earlier years, ranging from conflicts with in-laws due to cultural differences and language 
barriers, to domestic abuse and violence by Korean husbands. At one point, murders and suicides 
of foreign brides were happening so frequently that diplomats from the Philippines and Vietnam 
officially voiced their concern to the Korean government while the Cambodian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MFA) issued a Diplomatic Note in 2011 banning its women from marrying a 
foreign national aged 50 or older with a monthly income of less than USD 2,500, followed by the 
Vietnamese authorities’ similar measure to protect young Vietnamese women (IOM, 2013). 
Fortunately, these kinds of incidents were increasingly made public by advocate groups and 
media; since then, many Koreans have been active in improving the living conditions of 
multicultural families, and the government has also started a few initiatives at both the local and 
national levels to raise awareness and to provide support not only to foreign brides but to 
members in multicultural families as a whole. Consequently, divorce rates have been reduced 
significantly in the past decade and multicultural family support/advocacy NGOs can now be 
found in all major cities in Korea. 
Research Purpose 
The main goal of this paper is to identify what determines people’s attitudes toward immigration 
in Korea, and to what extent. In the following section, I will first introduce the leading theories 
and past research findings to identify the influential factors, including but not limited to 
sociocultural and economic ones. Some determinants may be obvious and easy to measure (one’s 
household income, age, education level, etc.), while others intangible and abstract (national-/self-
identity, perceived threat, etc.). After providing a structured summary of the main theories and 
empirical evidence, I will move on to examine Korea’s case. Since most of the prominent studies 
have been conducted in the West with a much longer history of immigration, there is a limited 
number of scholarly work available in English that is specific to the country’s immigration 
situation. Moreover, while KGSS (Korean General Social Survey), which is conducted annually 
to cover various social issues in the country, can be useful for grasping the overall social 
atmosphere and general opinion of the public, it suffers from the fact that it does not cover 
immigration-related topics nor public attitudes in depth. Other reports and data posed a similar 
problem as well. Consequently, I decided to design my own survey with the specific goal of 
identifying determinants of public attitudes toward immigration in South Korea. With the survey 
results, this paper builds on existing work such as publications by IOM (International 
Organization for Migration) Korea, Asan Institute, and reports and data from various ministries 
and government institutions of Korea, to fill in unidentified determinants in regards to the 
public’s attitude formation for immigration. I believe the findings will contribute to the literature 
on immigration, especially for countries with an immigrant history and background similar to 
that of South Korea. 
 
Literature Review 
Determinants Found in Previous Research in the West 
No definite consensus has been reached as to what causes natives to view immigration positively 
or negatively in academics or among policy makers. To make matters more complicated, 
attitudes tend to shift often; thus, establishing a precise reason for anti-immigration does not 
neatly fit into a box. That is probably why there are so many different approaches in attempting 
to identify what influences immigration attitudes. Most research focuses on individual and 
household characteristics in relation to attitudes (see Citrin et al., 1997; Fetzer, 2000; Schildkraut, 
2005; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Sniderman et al., 2004) via economic or social approaches. While 
the former approach frequently relates how an individual views his or her economic stability and 
prospects to explain immigration attitudes, the latter takes a closer look at cultural responses 
toward newcomers. I believe that both material and symbolic concerns are at work in shaping 
attitudes toward immigration. So here I will lay out some interesting findings and well-known 
conclusions on immigration attitudes that I intend to compare and contrast with the results from 
my own findings for Korea’s case.  
Economic factors. There are two broad categories for economic approaches: fiscal burdens 
and market competition. Fiscal burden, simply put, emphasizes the extra pressure put on 
natives due to immigration (e.g. increased burdens of welfare services and social benefits to 
cover immigrants). The argument goes that the fear of having to pay more tax for various 
infrastructures and services arises among natives, which often becomes catalysts of 
opposition to immigration (Coenders & Scheepers, 1998; Cornelius & Rosenblum, 2005; 
Quillian, 1995). This fiscal impact on host countries’ public finance is a widely debated topic 
for governments as well. Though not uniformly confirmed by the literature, most studies 
suggest that immigrants are more likely to rely on/consume welfare services than natives in 
most European countries, at least until assimilation, compared to in the US or Canada (Baker 
& Benjamin, 1995; Borjas & Trejo, 1991; Büchel & Frick, 2005; Gustman & Steinmeier, 
2000; Hansen & Lofstrom, 2003; Kerr & Kerr, 2011). Nevertheless, this should not be 
simplified to “immigrants=fiscal burdens.” Numerous empirical studies examined whether 
taxes paid by immigrants over their lifetime cover the host country’s public goods and 
welfare services and many conclude that the total impact, positive or negative, is minor4 in 
most countries (Kerr & Kerr, 2011; Lee & Miller, 2000; Moscarola, 2001; Storesletten, 
2003). Variations are bound to appear due to differences in welfare policies and structures 
                                                 
4 After taking into account the various assumptions made by different studies on immigration’s fiscal impact, 
Rowthorn (2008) reviewed and concluded that in developed countries, the net impact was less than 1% of the host 
country’s GDP. 
across countries, not to mention different characteristics of immigrant groups (e.g. young 
refugees vs. middle-aged skilled workers).  
The second approach, referred to as “labor market competition theory,” states that natives 
perceive more threat from immigrant workers of similar skill level due to job competition. In 
addition, some argue that growth of labor supply would negatively affect natives’ average 
wage. These predictions would work under a standard labor supply-demand framework in a 
closed economy (Borjas, 2003; Borjas et al., 1996; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001); however, 
estimating and evaluating displacement effects are more challenging in reality as so many 
variables are involved. Consequently, numerous empirical studies have been conducted by 
scholars to understand the issue better. The consensus seems to be that immigration has little 
to no impact on native wages in both the US and the UK (Dustmann et al., 2008; Friedberg & 
Hunt, 1995; Longhi et al., 2005; Okkerse, 2008). Small wage elasticity was also seen in 
European countries despite large immigrant inflows. Brücker and Jahn’s analysis (2011), for 
instance, demonstrates that a 1% increase of labor force through immigration reduced wages 
by just 0.1% in Germany. The effect of employment displacement also saw little evidence, 
though there is some evidence that points to possibilities of employment displacement in 
Europe being higher than in the US (Longhi et al., 2006). 
Despite the above findings, the general public often views immigration as an economic 
threat and the media’s negative portrayals do not help either. Interestingly though, recent 
studies show that personal material self-interest does not significantly affect how natives feel 
about immigration (Card et al., 2011; Citrin et al., 1997; Dancygier & Donelly, 2013; 
Hainmueller et al., 2015; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; 
Iyengar et al., 2013; Newman et al., 2012). It has been proven that workers of all industries, 
regardless of their skills or income levels, express more support for high-skilled immigrant 
workers. High-skilled natives should show objection to immigrants with high skills due to 
heightened competition according to the market competition claim, so why don’t they? We 
cannot simply rule out economic self-interest as one of the factors that shape the public’s 
attitudes, since high-skilled immigrants do not just represent “competition.” They are also 
perceived as relatively a small threat to society with higher education levels and economic 
stability (therefore, fewer burdens). The possibility lies in that the public looks past the 
heightened competition by high-skilled immigrants, not because economic self-interest does 
not matter but because positive effects outweigh the negative ones. Another explanation can 
be attributed to the higher level of income and education of natives engaged in high-skilled 
jobs, both of which were repeatedly proven to be linked to less restrictionist attitudes toward 
immigrants as I will elaborate in the following section.  
Sociocultural factors. Various studies have examined sociocultural determinants for a 
public’s views on immigration. The more educated the respondents are, the more emphasis 
they put on cultural diversity and they are also more likely to view immigration’s economic 
impacts positively (Card et al., 2011; Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Citrin et al., 1997; Hainmueller 
& Hiscox, 2010). On the other hand, lack of education and misperceived threats seem to play 
an important role in shaping natives’ attitudes toward immigration. For instance, stereotypes 
and prejudice for immigrant group(s) result in animus toward immigration (Citrin et al., 1997; 
Stephan et al., 1999). Burns and Gimpel (2000) consider that economic hardship may further 
influence stereotypical thinking, while Valentino et al. (2012) examines the media’s role in 
reinforcing the feeling of aversion. In US and European countries, the majority of 
respondents who oppose immigration overestimated the number of immigrants in the country, 
which demonstrates that perception of immigration inflows matter (Citrin & Sides, 2008; 
Sides & Citrin, 2007). Moreover, when culturally threatening cues are given, such as 
“immigrants who do not speak the language/are not expected to fit in well with the culture”, 
they bring out stronger oppositions than economic cues (Sniderman et al., 2004). Natives 
who have had interactions or direct contact with immigrants, on the other hand, are less 
likely to expel immigrants (McLaren, 2003; Ellison et al., 2011), as often described in 
literature on “contact theory”. 
As for identity-related determinants, natives who take an ethno-cultural jus sanguinis 
view versus civic jus soli conceptions for national identity are more supportive of restricting 
immigration (Kim & Park, 2013; Schildkraut, 2005; Wright et al., 2012). Accordingly, 
people who do not adhere clearly to either an ethnic or civic model often hold the most 
welcoming attitudes toward immigrants (Medrano & Koenig, 2005). As Benedict Anderson 
wrote in his famous book, Imagined Communities (1983), people view their nation as a single 
community where they are connected to other members by common values. These values can 
be shared ethnicity, language, and history, but also civic ideology as in the case of the United 
States. However, this notion is not inherent for a nation but rather like an invention, as the 
name suggests. Since nationalism plays an important role in determining people’s views on 
immigration, some countries are trying to redefine conceptions of citizenship through 
education and integration policies. 
The common thread we seem to find in previous findings is that when natives 
(mis)perceive threats, they are more likely to oppose immigration. It can be a threat to a 
nation’s economy, society, and culture; a threat to people’s identity and concept of unified 
community; or an actual physical threat. In addition, the degrees to which a country responds 
to these threats differ as demonstrated by a study by Iyengar et al. (2013). While sociotropic 
economic concerns proved to be especially influential in the US and UK, cultural concerns 
are just as influential in Korea and Japan (possibly due to the traditional homogeneous nature 
of the nations). Thus, the perception that immigrants will violate the meaning of what it 
means to be Japanese or Korean brings out hostility toward immigration since immigrants 
bring a distinctive language, culture, and religion to the dominant culture of the nation.  
Studies on South Korea’s Case 
There have been some studies that covered certain determinants for public attitudes toward 
immigration in Korea in the past. However, because the data used are heavily based on the 
results from general world surveys, such as the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), 
European Social Survey (ESS) and the General Social Survey (GSS), it is quite difficult to draw 
any valuable conclusion on detailed attitude formation from the broad findings. Such studies 
might have their own merits, but when it comes to immigration and public attitudes, country-
specific factors play an important role, which should not be generalized or overlooked. Even 
when a Korean-specific survey module called the Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) was 
developed by the Survey Research Center of Sung Kyun Kwan University, it narrowly focused 
on the correlation of national identity and attitudes toward migration with most of the 
determinants limited to demographic information. Kim & Park (2013) nevertheless found an 
interesting result on social distance toward different foreign immigrant groups, which I am 
verifying in this paper as well.  
A number of government institutes in Korea occasionally carry out surveys and publish 
reports related to immigration as well. For example, the Korea Women’s Development Institute 
(KWDI) has conducted studies on immigrants, especially focusing on women (Kim et al., 2011) 
and multicultural families in Korea. Other institutes and governmental organizations increasingly 
are dealing with this important issue of immigration as the number of foreign residents keeps 
rising each year. However, there is a limitation to their studies, as the very nature of such 
institutes and organizations are to suggest policies to the government (See Seol et al., 2009). As a 
result, researchers have been more focused on institutional regulation and policies in general. 
While indispensable, these approaches taken by the majority of previous studies lack specificity 
in finding out how the general public’s attitudes are formed since not enough data exists to 
confirm each determinant’s role. Moreover, most studies merely summarize the sample data 
without further conducting a quantitative data analysis and thus fail to become a true 
representation of the population of Korea.  
It would not be wise to try to come up with policy suggestions for which we still lack 
understanding. Therefore this study aims to remedy this gap by examining each determinant of 
the public’s attitudes toward immigration first, so that more in-depth research on migration, 
citizenship, as well as integration, can be conducted in the future. I designed this unique survey 
after thoroughly reviewing existing literature and examining prior research and survey data on 
public attitudes toward immigration. This study not only focuses on natives’ characteristics but 
also includes varying characteristics of immigrants to have a more comprehensive idea of what 
determines natives’ attitudes toward immigration. As stated earlier, this study has two main 
purposes: 1) To verify and/or to compare the latest results in Korea with other findings and 2) To 
fill in the missing parts from the previous studies by suggesting more control variables to test for 
their impact.  
Hypotheses After Literature Review 
This paper assumes the following hypotheses concerning determinants and how they affect a 
public’s attitudes toward immigration.  
- When a respondent has a misperceived notion about the number of immigrants in his/her 
country (overestimation), the person is more likely to oppose immigration. 
- A respondent whose view on immigration is influenced by media is more likely to oppose 
immigration since media coverage on immigration often disproportionately depicts the 
negative sides, such as crimes committed by foreigners. 
- Highly educated natives are more open to immigration, regardless of their current 
household income. 
- A respondent who has the most flexible view on the concept of citizenship expresses the 
most welcoming attitude toward immigration. 
- When a respondent feels that immigrants in the country are making an effort to fit into 
the society, he/she shows a more favorable attitude toward immigration. 
- A respondent who believes in racial/ethnic stereotypes is more likely to oppose 
immigration. 
- If a respondent has had a positive interaction/contact with a foreigner, he/she would be 
more open to immigration. 
 
Methodology 
Survey Design 
The survey used was designed specifically for this paper to identify factors that shape the 
public’s attitudes toward immigration in South Korea. There are 19 to 23 questions in total as 
shown in Appendix1, comprised of 12 designed questions with 3 possible sub-questions and 7 
demographic questions with a possible sub-question. Most questions ask citizens the degree 
which he or she (dis)agrees with a given statement. Each question was carefully contemplated, 
some based on previous research on immigration attitudes while others unique to this study. 
They are meant to contribute to understanding each determinant and its importance more in 
depth in the specific context of Korea.  
Implementation 
 
The target population is adults (19 years or older) residing in Korea, across the nation to mirror 
the population on key demographic attributes5 through stratified quota sampling. The sample size 
is 1,000 via interviewer-administered telephone surveys (RDD method) conducted from October 
31 to November 10, 2016 with the help of Economic Information and Education Center (EIEC) 
of the Korea Development Institute (KDI).  
Featured Determinants (Control Variables) 
*Descriptions will follow when necessary. 
Perception of (legal & illegal) immigration inflows 
:  
Instead of just having a question on immigration inflows, I decided to divide it into two. So for 
this study, there will be 1) A question asking a respondent to estimate the percentage of 
immigrants in Korea’s total population and 2) A following question that asks a respondent to 
estimate the percentage of illegal immigrants among immigrants.   
Appraisal of assimilation efforts 
Belief in racial/ethnic stereotypes 
:  
                                                 
5 For region, gender, and age with ±3.1% margin of error 
To test this, I provide three common stereotypes one can encounter in Korea toward three 
different ethnic/racial groups: Chinese, Japanese, and African. 
Influence of mass media 
Direct contact experience with foreign residents 
Ethnic vs. civic conception of citizenship 
:  
For this variable, I describe two groups and ask “which of the two do you consider to be more 
Korean?” The first one is a foreign national of Korean heritage and the second one is a 
naturalized Korean citizen of foreign origin. I provide real-life examples of famous athletes to 
facilitate understanding.  
Immigrants’ professional status and country of origin 
:  
Nine different immigrant groups are shown, divided by three countries of origin with three 
different occupations. Southeast Asia and China were chosen because most immigrants in Korea 
come from those regions. Eastern Europe was chosen in addition because even though the region 
is no better off than Korea economically, immigrants from this region seem to be regarded 
favorably in Korea possibly from their European appearances. For profession, manual laborer 
and foreign bride were chosen because they make up a large portion of immigrants in Korea as 
described in the introduction. Investor was added to see if differences would be observed from 
one’s country of origin despite the positive economic association with the profession. 
Donation/volunteer experience 
:  
This has not been studied much so I added this variable to this study. It does not seem unlikely to 
find a correlation since attitude on immigration may be affected by sympathy and generosity.  
Satisfaction with life (rated from 0 to 100) 
:  
No research was found for this determinant, either, so I decided to include it to test the 
correlation and impact. My hypothesis is that the more a respondent is satisfied with his/her life, 
the more he/she is likely to show a favorable attitude toward immigration. 
Demographic information (residential area, gender, age, education level, employment status, 
household income, religion and religiosity) 
:  
On top of the usual demographic information, this study has a sub-question called religiosity to 
see if following religious doctrines and considering oneself more religious would affect the 
respondent’s attitude toward immigration. 
Empirical Strategies 
Hypotheses suggested by the existing literature and from my own argument are tested using the 
data from the survey result. This study employs logit regression analysis to see the correlation 
between each control variable and natives’ positive attitudes on immigration and to estimate the 
impact of the determinants. Accordingly, the dependent variable in this paper is the public’s 
attitude in the form of binary variables (0=negative attitude, 1=positive attitude). The logit model 
helps to see the effect of independent variables on the log odds to measure the relative 
probabilities of favorable immigration attitudes among natives in Korea. The independent 
variables in the logit model also have been turned into mostly binary responses for simpler 
interpretation of results. The specific logit model equation for estimation is as follows:  
𝑃 (𝑌 = 1) =
𝑒𝑥𝛽
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝛽
 
where,   𝑥𝛽 = 𝑥1𝛽1 + 𝑥2𝛽2 + 𝑥3𝛽3 +··· +𝑥𝑘𝛽𝑘 + 𝜀 
 Y is the dependent variable. As mentioned earlier, the public’s attitudes (positive=1, 
negative=0) will be examined from two different aspects: 1) toward immigration in 
general, and 2) toward group-specific immigrants divided by countries of origin and 
occupations.  
 P signifies the probability when the dependent variable Y takes the value of 1. It always 
has a value between 0 and 1. 
 𝑥𝑘 represents the independent variables laid out earlier and 𝛽𝑘 represents the coefficients 
for the independent variables, 𝑥𝑘. (𝜀 indicates the error term.) 
Findings 
One of the most interesting findings of this study is that while overall sentiments for 
immigration in general tend to be positive in Korea6, they did not necessarily carry over to 
favorable attitudes toward specific immigrant groups. Discrepancies were found among 
immigrant groups from different countries, so singling out a country-specific group which is 
often associated with negative stereotypes appears to cause natives to take a less favorable stance 
compared to a generic concept of immigration, bringing out what I call a “group-negativity bias.”  
The result is striking. While only 1 determinant, belief in racial/ethnic stereotypes, was found to 
have a negative correlation with the public’s attitudes toward immigration in general, 2-4 
determinants have negative correlations in case of the Chinese group (the variation comes from 
the immigrant’s occupation) and 2-3 determinants for the Southeast Asian group, while no 
negatively correlated determinant was found in case of the East European group with the 
exception of manual laborers. This is understandable when we take into consideration the stigma 
attached to immigrant manual laborers in Korean society. The result demonstrates how a group-
negativity bias influences public attitudes toward immigrants in Korea. People who believe in 
                                                 
6 Contrary to findings by Iyengar et al. (2013) 
common racial/ethnic stereotypes are found to be less likely to show favorable attitudes toward 
immigration in general and also toward five specific groups in the scenario. The negative impact 
is found to be the strongest for Chinese manual laborers and surprisingly also for Chinese 
investors7. One possible explanation is that as many local governments have relaxed their 
regulations for investors from abroad, some Chinese investors have shown merciless or 
unprecedented practices which have led to confrontations with locals at times, notably in Busan 
and Jeju. So there are grounds for a negative association to Chinese investors. East European 
investors were the only exception with no negative correlation found, since the region is not 
associated with any negative stereotypes in Korea. Based on our results, we can conclude that an 
immigrant’s occupational status and economic status may not be such a strong predictor of 
evaluating immigrants at least in the case of Korea since other factors, such as country of origin, 
seem to carry as much weight, if not more. 
As verified by many earlier pieces of research, education level has a high correlation with 
immigration attitudes in our study. However, that too failed to carry over to specific immigrant 
groups. While more educated people who completed high school or more showed more favorable 
attitudes toward immigration in general, no correlation was found for their attitudes for the 
Chinese immigrant group of all three professions, and a strong correlation was found only for 
investors in case of Southeast Asian and East European group. Assimilation effort proved to be a 
determinant that is strongly correlated with public’s attitudes toward immigration, even in 
specific immigrant group settings. When we take a look at the coefficients, the public’s attitudes 
are especially more likely to be favorable when they feel manual laborers or Southeast Asians 
are trying hard to fit into the Korean society, holding everything else constant. Direct contact 
                                                 
7 This study also found that females and those who are employed are more likely to show unfavorable attitudes 
toward Chinese investors. 
experience with foreign residents in Korea showed a positive correlation for immigration in 
general, but the correlation disappeared for most of the specific immigrant groups; a positive 
correlation was found only with manual laborers from Southeast Asia and foreign brides also 
from Southeast Asia for some reason. Influence by mass media did not show a correlation of 
statistical significance with attitude toward immigration in general contrary to my hypothesis. 
However, it did appear significant for attitude toward Southeast Asian manual laborers and 
Southeast Asian foreign brides. It shows that if a respondent’s view on immigration is shaped by 
media, he/she is less likely to hold a favorable view toward the two aforementioned immigrant 
groups from Southeast Asia.   
Some demographic information also brought interesting results. A negative correlation 
was found between age and favorable attitude toward Chinese immigrants and manual laborers 
from Eastern Europe. In other words, the older a respondent was the less he/she was likely to 
support any immigrant from China regardless of profession and manual laborers from Eastern 
Europe. People residing in Seoul and the areas nearby (Gyonggi and Incheon) are more likely to 
show favorable attitudes toward manual laborers from China and Eastern Europe and investors 
from Southeast Asia. 
 Satisfaction with life, though unique to this study, turned out to be an important 
determinant with a strong positive correlation to favorable attitudes toward immigration in 
general. Compared to many other determinants, the correlation still stayed strong in some group-
specific cases when country of origin and occupation for immigrants were specified. Therefore, 
this study finds that the more satisfied a person is with his or her life, the probability of having a 
positive attitude toward immigration increases, ceteris paribus. As for estimation of immigrants 
(legal and illegal) no correlation was found between the public’s attitudes and overestimation of 
inflow of immigrants; therefore the claim by Citrin and Sides could not be verified in Korea’s 
case. However, the additional question I added for estimating the percentage of illegal 
immigrants showed a strong correlation for certain specific immigrant groups. Those who 
overestimate the percentage of illegal immigrants out of the entire immigrant population in 
Korea are more likely to be against manual laborers from Eastern Europe and China, and 
investors from Southeast Asia and China.  
Lastly, the study found the likelihood of falling under certain characteristics depending 
on how a person defines Koreanness. People who hold a flexible and broadest view of 
Koreanness (being Korean can be either by citizenship or by heritage) were more likely to hold 
favorable views toward immigration, volunteer and donate more, have higher satisfaction with 
life, and reside in or nearby Seoul. On the other hand, people who hold the strictest view of 
Koreanness (one has to have Korean heritage AND hold a citizenship) is more likely to 
overestimate the percentage of immigrants in the country. Those who choose heritage over 
citizenship for Koreanness are likely to be older, live outside of Seoul, and overestimate the 
percentage of immigrants in Korea. People who choose citizenship over heritage are likely to be 
younger and have a higher household income. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This study examines the key factors of the public’s attitudes toward immigration first by 
monitoring the existing literature, then through a survey designed and conducted specifically for 
this occasion to identify the determinants of attitudes of natives toward immigration in general 
and for specific immigrant groups in Korea divided by countries of origin and occupations. The 
results of the empirical analysis suggest some crucial findings. 
 First, results suggest that belief in racial/ethnic stereotypes strongly influences the 
public’s attitudes toward immigrants, especially for groups from China and Southeast Asia. 
Variations are observed across professions at times, but belief in stereotypes proved to be a 
strong factor in Korea’s case as well. Assimilation effort was another factor that consistently 
showed a high correlation in this study. The more immigrants were thought to be making efforts 
to adapt to the host society, the more favorable the public’s views were likely to become. This 
finding is consistent with the literature (Citrin et al., 1997; Sniderman et al., 2004). This turns out 
especially to be true for immigrants from Southeast Asia. Lastly, satisfaction with life was 
observed to be positively correlated with favorable attitudes toward immigration. The extent 
varies for different immigrant groups, but in general when a person is satisfied with his/her life, 
he/she is more likely to hold a favorable view toward immigration. 
 Surprisingly, there were many variables that were specific only to certain immigrant 
groups. The group-negativity bias deserves more attention as to why people’s reactions differed 
so much when a specific group of immigrant was described in comparison to their reactions to 
the generic word “immigration.” I do not believe this phenomenon is unique to South Korea, so 
future research possibilities lie ahead in this area. Lastly, there have been some determinants that 
were proven to be influential in many previous studies but could not be verified of significance 
in this study. Overestimation of immigration inflows would be one of them. High education and 
income levels were not proven to be that highly correlated with immigration attitudes in Korea 
either, not quite meeting expectations from the hypothesis after the literature review.  
 Overall, I believe this paper provides the first comprehensive and systematic analysis of 
what influences the public’s attitudes toward immigration and also toward specific immigrant 
groups in Korea’s case. The research did a thorough review of existing literature to design each 
survey question and, using the most recent data, conducted a quantitative analysis employing a 
logit model. Though many things are still left to be studied, I believe countries with a similar 
immigration history as Korea’s can benefit from this study.  
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TABLES 
 
Table1. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward Immigration (dummy 1=favorable) 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 q12, satisfaction with one’s life appears to be strongly correlated with positive immigration attitude (p<0.01 in 
every category, counted as demographic information).   
 q2 and q3, estimation of % of legal/illegal immigrants, did not show any correlation.    
 Women show unfavorable attitudes at times, but the correlation is not statistically significant. (1=female in sq2) 
 Higher education level (high school graduates and up) and favorable attitudes toward immigration have a 
positive relationship (p<0.05 in most cases) 
 Age, one’s employment status or income level did not have any significant relationship, contrary to my 
prediction (at least for the non-group-specific model) 
 Other positive correlations found in: q4) those who think immigrants are trying hard to assimilate, q6) those 
who are in favor of having more immigrants from developed countries, and q8) those who had a direct contact 
experience with foreigners in Korea.   
 A strong negative correlation found in q5) those who believe in racial/ethnic stereotypes. 
 P<0.1 but worth mentioning: q9) those who believed in only heritage as a prerequisite for being a real Korean 
were opposed to immigration. (1=①, 0=②③④), and q11) those who are volunteering/donating. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table2-1. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward East European immigrants of different professions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE1 EE2 EE3 
    
q12 -8.43e-05 0.000134 0.00129 
 (0.000958) (0.000896) (0.000842) 
sq1 0.0747** 0.0602* 0.0517* 
 (0.0340) (0.0318) (0.0304) 
sq2 -0.0151 -0.0366 -0.0108 
 (0.0361) (0.0337) (0.0323) 
sq3 -0.00376*** -0.000880 -0.00166 
 (0.00132) (0.00124) (0.00118) 
sq4 0.0990 0.173** 0.0423 
 (0.0667) (0.0680) (0.0593) 
sq5 -0.0712* -0.0469 -0.00993 
 (0.0379) (0.0358) (0.0344) 
sq6 -0.0418 -0.0430 -0.0632* 
 (0.0365) (0.0344) (0.0328) 
sq7 -0.0323 0.00534 -0.0172 
 (0.0355) (0.0337) (0.0318) 
q3 -0.00265***   
 (0.000997)   
q4 0.0986*** 0.0707** 0.0698** 
 (0.0341) (0.0320) (0.0304) 
q5 -0.0980***  -0.0587* 
 (0.0348)  (0.0313) 
q6 0.137*** 0.143*** 0.109*** 
 (0.0348) (0.0320) (0.0311) 
q11  0.0547  
  (0.0334)  
q9   -0.0582* 
   (0.0346) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table2-2. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward Southeast Asian immigrants of different professions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES SEA1 SEA2 SEA3 
    
q12 0.000839 -0.000474 -7.34e-05 
 (0.000971) (0.000923) (0.000914) 
sq1 0.0191 0.0746** 0.00713 
 (0.0346) (0.0326) (0.0326) 
sq2 -0.0311 -0.0513 -0.0218 
 (0.0371) (0.0345) (0.0348) 
sq3 -0.00192 -0.000752 0.000242 
 (0.00135) (0.00126) (0.00127) 
sq4 0.0178 0.174** 0.0878 
 (0.0659) (0.0678) (0.0665) 
sq5 -0.0214 -0.00154 -0.0311 
 (0.0393) (0.0368) (0.0365) 
sq6 -0.0409 -0.0246 -0.0517 
 (0.0369) (0.0350) (0.0347) 
sq7 -0.0234 0.00305 -0.0201 
 (0.0366) (0.0342) (0.0341) 
q4 0.117*** 0.127*** 0.116*** 
 (0.0343) (0.0324) (0.0322) 
q5 -0.124*** -0.0935*** -0.0842** 
 (0.0350) (0.0332) (0.0332) 
q6 0.114*** 0.125*** 0.119*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0334) (0.0333) 
q7 -0.0779**  -0.0770** 
 (0.0344)  (0.0323) 
q8 0.0648*  0.0608* 
 (0.0379)  (0.0357) 
q9 -0.0405  -0.0948** 
 (0.0383)  (0.0370) 
q11 0.0456   
 (0.0364)   
q3  -0.00192**  
  (0.000950)  
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
Table2-3. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward Chinese immigrants of different professions 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES CHN1 CHN2 CHN3 
    
q12 0.00168* 0.00140 0.00219** 
 (0.000973) (0.000997) (0.000985) 
sq1 0.0841** 0.0422 0.0348 
 (0.0349) (0.0358) (0.0353) 
sq2 -0.0527 -0.0926** -0.0382 
 (0.0366) (0.0375) (0.0372) 
sq3 -0.00410*** -0.00334** -0.00330** 
 (0.00133) (0.00137) (0.00136) 
sq4 0.0759 0.0692 -0.00159 
 (0.0666) (0.0676) (0.0671) 
sq5 0.000425 -0.111*** -0.00693 
 (0.0395) (0.0405) (0.0399) 
sq6 -0.0424 -0.0150 -0.0512 
 (0.0366) (0.0378) (0.0374) 
sq7 -0.00779 -0.0385 0.00695 
 (0.0363) (0.0371) (0.0368) 
q3 -0.00304*** -0.00247** -0.00196* 
 (0.00106) (0.00106) (0.00104) 
q4 0.104*** 0.0603*  
 (0.0355) (0.0363)  
q5 -0.186*** -0.178*** -0.138*** 
 (0.0358) (0.0361) (0.0359) 
q6 0.0729* 0.0686* 0.0711* 
 (0.0376) (0.0382) (0.0374) 
q7   -0.0640* 
   (0.0351) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tables 3-1. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward Manual Laborers from different countries 
(by each variable plus demographic info) 
Overestimation of illegal immigrant percentage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE1 SEA1 CHN1 
q3 -0.00284*** -0.00127 -0.00319*** 
 (0.000987) (0.000994) (0.00103) 
q12 0.000631 0.00189** 0.00228** 
 (0.000932) (0.000930) (0.000955) 
sq1 0.0678** 0.0156 0.0717** 
 (0.0335) (0.0338) (0.0341) 
sq2 -0.0336 -0.0563 -0.0720** 
 (0.0353) (0.0353) (0.0355) 
sq3 -0.00363*** -0.00196 -0.00432*** 
 (0.00129) (0.00128) (0.00130) 
sq4 0.102 0.0198 0.0720 
 (0.0655) (0.0638) (0.0661) 
sq5 -0.0679* -0.00320 0.00529 
 (0.0375) (0.0381) (0.0386) 
sq6 -0.0327 -0.0226 -0.0270 
 (0.0359) (0.0359) (0.0357) 
sq7 -0.0334 -0.0158 -0.0106 
 (0.0349) (0.0351) (0.0355) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Assimilation Effort 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE1 SEA1 CHN1 
q4 0.118*** 0.132*** 0.122*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0335) (0.0345) 
q12 0.000252 0.00161* 0.00190** 
 (0.000934) (0.000936) (0.000954) 
sq1 0.0708** 0.0238 0.0753** 
 (0.0336) (0.0340) (0.0342) 
sq2 -0.0364 -0.0604* -0.0744** 
 (0.0354) (0.0356) (0.0356) 
sq3 -0.00375*** -0.00223* -0.00450*** 
 (0.00130) (0.00130) (0.00130) 
sq4 0.115* 0.0307 0.0851 
 (0.0663) (0.0650) (0.0650) 
sq5 -0.0678* -0.00603 0.00471 
 (0.0376) (0.0383) (0.0386) 
sq6 -0.0374 -0.0287 -0.0334 
 (0.0360) (0.0361) (0.0358) 
sq7 -0.0407 -0.0233 -0.0194 
 (0.0350) (0.0353) (0.0355) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Belief in Racial/Ethnic Stereotypes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE1 SEA1 CHN1 
    
q5 -0.110*** -0.136*** -0.193*** 
 (0.0341) (0.0342) (0.0353) 
q12 0.000336 0.00167* 0.00186* 
 (0.000933) (0.000938) (0.000960) 
sq1 0.0624* 0.0141 0.0673** 
 (0.0334) (0.0339) (0.0343) 
sq2 -0.0216 -0.0427 -0.0524 
 (0.0355) (0.0357) (0.0361) 
sq3 -0.00304** -0.00137 -0.00344*** 
 (0.00130) (0.00130) (0.00131) 
sq4 0.107 0.0241 0.0799 
 (0.0657) (0.0642) (0.0657) 
sq5 -0.0651* -0.00319 0.00726 
 (0.0375) (0.0383) (0.0390) 
sq6 -0.0381 -0.0293 -0.0374 
 (0.0359) (0.0361) (0.0362) 
sq7 -0.0318 -0.0124 -0.00593 
 (0.0350) (0.0353) (0.0358) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Thoughts on immigration influenced by the media 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE1 SEA1 CHN1 
    
q7 -0.0378 -0.0812** -0.0362 
 (0.0335) (0.0336) (0.0339) 
q12 0.000444 0.00177* 0.00208** 
 (0.000928) (0.000932) (0.000951) 
sq1 0.0600* 0.0115 0.0634* 
 (0.0333) (0.0338) (0.0338) 
sq2 -0.0330 -0.0563 -0.0700** 
 (0.0352) (0.0354) (0.0354) 
sq3 -0.00355*** -0.00213* -0.00423*** 
 (0.00129) (0.00129) (0.00129) 
sq4 0.109* 0.0309 0.0799 
 (0.0657) (0.0646) (0.0654) 
sq5 -0.0655* -0.00667 0.00720 
 (0.0375) (0.0382) (0.0385) 
sq6 -0.0337 -0.0249 -0.0278 
 (0.0358) (0.0360) (0.0356) 
sq7 -0.0326 -0.0114 -0.0114 
 (0.0349) (0.0352) (0.0353) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Direct contact with foreigner in Korea 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE1 SEA1 CHN1 
q8 0.0139 0.0805** 0.0255 
 (0.0365) (0.0368) (0.0368) 
q12 0.000444 0.00165* 0.00204** 
 (0.000930) (0.000934) (0.000954) 
sq1 0.0605* 0.0117 0.0636* 
 (0.0333) (0.0338) (0.0338) 
sq2 -0.0306 -0.0431 -0.0658* 
 (0.0356) (0.0359) (0.0359) 
sq3 -0.00340*** -0.00164 -0.00405*** 
 (0.00129) (0.00129) (0.00130) 
sq4 0.104 0.0193 0.0751 
 (0.0654) (0.0640) (0.0656) 
sq5 -0.0648* -0.0116 0.00704 
 (0.0377) (0.0384) (0.0386) 
sq6 -0.0327 -0.0225 -0.0269 
 (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.0355) 
sq7 -0.0363 -0.0239 -0.0154 
 (0.0349) (0.0352) (0.0354) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Tables 3-2. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward Investors from different countries 
(by each variable plus demographic info) 
Overestimation of illegal immigrant percentage 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE2 SEA2 CHN2 
q3 -0.000812 -0.00214** -0.00262** 
 (0.000937) (0.000947) (0.00104) 
q12 0.000863 0.000271 0.00191** 
 (0.000877) (0.000899) (0.000973) 
sq1 0.0586* 0.0657** 0.0362 
 (0.0317) (0.0323) (0.0350) 
sq2 -0.0443 -0.0673** -0.111*** 
 (0.0334) (0.0339) (0.0364) 
sq3 -0.000379 -0.000649 -0.00369*** 
 (0.00123) (0.00124) (0.00134) 
sq4 0.194*** 0.170** 0.0680 
 (0.0666) (0.0662) (0.0665) 
sq5 -0.0398 0.000942 -0.104*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0365) (0.0397) 
sq6 -0.0346 -0.0158 -0.00352 
 (0.0341) (0.0347) (0.0370) 
sq7 0.0146 0.00283 -0.0421 
 (0.0332) (0.0338) (0.0363) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Assimilation Efforts 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE2 SEA2 CHN2 
    
q4 0.0868*** 0.144*** 0.0784** 
 (0.0317) (0.0319) (0.0353) 
q12 0.000654 -0.000119 0.00163* 
 (0.000879) (0.000904) (0.000972) 
sq1 0.0640** 0.0737** 0.0371 
 (0.0318) (0.0324) (0.0350) 
sq2 -0.0465 -0.0709** -0.112*** 
 (0.0335) (0.0340) (0.0364) 
sq3 -0.000520 -0.000844 -0.00374*** 
 (0.00123) (0.00125) (0.00134) 
sq4 0.204*** 0.188*** 0.0776 
 (0.0671) (0.0672) (0.0662) 
sq5 -0.0414 -0.000215 -0.103*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0366) (0.0397) 
sq6 -0.0383 -0.0224 -0.00739 
 (0.0342) (0.0348) (0.0370) 
sq7 0.00995 -0.00591 -0.0481 
 (0.0332) (0.0340) (0.0363) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Belief in racial/ethnic stereotypes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE2 SEA2 CHN2 
    
q5 -0.0226 -0.104*** -0.184*** 
 (0.0331) (0.0328) (0.0357) 
q12 0.000790 1.95e-05 0.00155 
 (0.000876) (0.000902) (0.000983) 
sq1 0.0569* 0.0618* 0.0329 
 (0.0317) (0.0322) (0.0353) 
sq2 -0.0417 -0.0559 -0.0938** 
 (0.0336) (0.0341) (0.0370) 
sq3 -0.000248 -0.000124 -0.00289** 
 (0.00124) (0.00125) (0.00135) 
sq4 0.195*** 0.175*** 0.0749 
 (0.0666) (0.0664) (0.0668) 
sq5 -0.0387 0.00322 -0.105*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0365) (0.0402) 
sq6 -0.0357 -0.0204 -0.0127 
 (0.0342) (0.0347) (0.0375) 
sq7 0.0146 0.00442 -0.0382 
 (0.0332) (0.0338) (0.0367) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Tables 3-3. Likelihood of Favorable Attitudes toward Foreign Brides from different countries 
(by each variable plus demographic info) 
Assimilation Efforts 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE3 SEA3 CHN3 
    
q4 0.0838*** 0.130*** 0.0437 
 (0.0302) (0.0317) (0.0350) 
q12 0.00166** 0.000572 0.00238** 
 (0.000834) (0.000890) (0.000967) 
sq1 0.0530* 0.0104 0.0348 
 (0.0304) (0.0323) (0.0348) 
sq2 -0.0271 -0.0501 -0.0576 
 (0.0321) (0.0338) (0.0363) 
sq3 -0.00195* -0.000255 -0.00350*** 
 (0.00117) (0.00124) (0.00133) 
sq4 0.0541 0.0894 0.000948 
 (0.0604) (0.0659) (0.0663) 
sq5 -0.0140 -0.0255 -0.000571 
 (0.0344) (0.0361) (0.0393) 
sq6 -0.0581* -0.0434 -0.0440 
 (0.0328) (0.0344) (0.0369) 
sq7 -0.0228 -0.0269 -0.00697 
 (0.0318) (0.0336) (0.0362) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
 
 
Belief in racial/ethnic stereotypes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE3 SEA3 CHN3 
q5 -0.0703** -0.0984*** -0.144*** 
 (0.0311) (0.0326) (0.0356) 
q12 0.00173** 0.000682 0.00230** 
 (0.000833) (0.000890) (0.000974) 
sq1 0.0472 0.000474 0.0327 
 (0.0304) (0.0322) (0.0350) 
sq2 -0.0174 -0.0359 -0.0425 
 (0.0322) (0.0339) (0.0369) 
sq3 -0.00150 0.000434 -0.00286** 
 (0.00118) (0.00124) (0.00134) 
sq4 0.0495 0.0806 0.000738 
 (0.0596) (0.0648) (0.0665) 
sq5 -0.0128 -0.0224 -0.00111 
 (0.0343) (0.0360) (0.0396) 
sq6 -0.0583* -0.0421 -0.0495 
 (0.0328) (0.0343) (0.0372) 
sq7 -0.0168 -0.0174 0.000125 
 (0.0317) (0.0335) (0.0364) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Thoughts on immigration influenced by the media 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE3 SEA3 CHN3 
    
q7 -0.0155 -0.0806** -0.0683** 
 (0.0305) (0.0319) (0.0346) 
q12 0.00179** 0.000741 0.00241** 
 (0.000831) (0.000886) (0.000968) 
sq1 0.0461 -0.00144 0.0301 
 (0.0304) (0.0322) (0.0347) 
sq2 -0.0250 -0.0461 -0.0567 
 (0.0321) (0.0338) (0.0364) 
sq3 -0.00182 -0.000196 -0.00359*** 
 (0.00117) (0.00124) (0.00133) 
sq4 0.0497 0.0885 0.00600 
 (0.0598) (0.0654) (0.0665) 
sq5 -0.0126 -0.0262 -0.00371 
 (0.0345) (0.0360) (0.0394) 
sq6 -0.0553* -0.0396 -0.0438 
 (0.0328) (0.0343) (0.0369) 
sq7 -0.0177 -0.0153 -0.000544 
 (0.0318) (0.0335) (0.0362) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Direct contact with foreigner in Korea 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE3 SEA3 CHN3 
    
q8 0.00419 0.0744** 0.0604 
 (0.0332) (0.0355) (0.0376) 
q12 0.00180** 0.000644 0.00233** 
 (0.000834) (0.000890) (0.000969) 
sq1 0.0463 -0.00115 0.0304 
 (0.0304) (0.0322) (0.0347) 
sq2 -0.0242 -0.0342 -0.0467 
 (0.0325) (0.0342) (0.0369) 
sq3 -0.00176 0.000275 -0.00320** 
 (0.00118) (0.00124) (0.00133) 
sq4 0.0476 0.0766 -0.00360 
 (0.0595) (0.0647) (0.0662) 
sq5 -0.0122 -0.0302 -0.00657 
 (0.0347) (0.0362) (0.0396) 
sq6 -0.0549* -0.0373 -0.0418 
 (0.0328) (0.0343) (0.0368) 
sq7 -0.0192 -0.0269 -0.0101 
 (0.0319) (0.0335) (0.0363) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Emphasis on heritage for “Koreanness” 
 (1) (2) (3) 
VARIABLES EE3 SEA3 CHN3 
    
q9 -0.0677* -0.114*** -0.0542 
 (0.0348) (0.0368) (0.0385) 
q12 0.00175** 0.000707 0.00241** 
 (0.000833) (0.000890) (0.000966) 
sq1 0.0471 0.00126 0.0319 
 (0.0304) (0.0322) (0.0347) 
sq2 -0.0247 -0.0460 -0.0564 
 (0.0320) (0.0337) (0.0364) 
sq3 -0.00154 0.000427 -0.00320** 
 (0.00117) (0.00124) (0.00133) 
sq4 0.0495 0.0812 -0.000949 
 (0.0597) (0.0650) (0.0662) 
sq5 -0.00846 -0.0157 0.00334 
 (0.0345) (0.0362) (0.0393) 
sq6 -0.0584* -0.0433 -0.0447 
 (0.0329) (0.0344) (0.0368) 
sq7 -0.0168 -0.0173 -0.00351 
 (0.0318) (0.0335) (0.0361) 
    
Observations 868 868 868 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDICES 
Appendix1: Survey Questionnaire (English translation) 
 Q1. How is your view on foreign residents in Korea? 
* Definition of foreign residents 
Foreigners residing in the country for a certain period of 
time, excluding tourists. Foreign manual laborers, 
professionals, trainees, foreign students, foreign brides, etc. 
①  Very favorable                           ☞ Go to Q1-1  
②  Favorable          ☞ Go to Q1-1 
③  Neither favorable nor unfavorable ☞Go to Q2  
④  Unfavorable                        ☞ Go to Q1-2 
⑤  Very unfavorable                        ☞ Go to Q1-2 
 
Q1-1. What is the biggest reason behind your 
favorable view toward foreign residents? 
①  They bring new ideas and diversity to 
the country. 
②  They are beneficial to Korea’s 
economy. 
③  They mitigate Korea’s demographic 
problems, such as aging population and 
low fertility rate.   
④ Other: _____________________________ 
 
Q1-2. What is the biggest reason behind your 
unfavorable view toward foreign residents? 
①  They take away jobs from Korean 
citizens. 
②  They lack understanding of Korean 
culture (history/language…) and 
destroy unity of the nation.  
③  They commit crimes and create various 
problems. 
④  Other: _____________________________ 
 
 
Q2. What percentage of Korea’s total population is 
foreign-born in your estimation?   
____________________% 
Q3. What percentage of foreign resident population 
are illegal immigrants in your estimation?   
____________________% 
 
Q4. Do you think foreign residents in Korea try hard 
to assimilate to the society?  
① Very much 
②  A little  
③  Neutral   
④  Not quite   
⑤  Not at all   
 
Q5. What do you think of sayings like “Japanese 
people act differently behind back.”, 
“Africans are lazy and not punctual.”, 
“Chinese people lack sense of hygiene.”, or 
“Americans are violent.”?  
①  Strongly agree 
②  Agree a little  
③  Neither agree nor disagree   
④  Disagree a little  
⑤  Strongly disagree  
 
Q6. What do you think of having more immigrants 
coming from developed countries? 
① Strongly approve 
② Approve a little 
③ Neither approve nor disapprove  
④  Disapprove a little  
⑤  Strongly disapprove  
 
Q7. Do you think your view on immigrants is influenced by
TV, newspaper, and other media? 
①  Very much so  ☞ Go to Q7-1  
②  A little  ☞ Go to Q7-1  
③  Neutral  ☞ Go to Q8   
④  Not quite              ☞ Go to Q8  
⑤  Not at all  ☞ Go to Q8   
 
Q7-1. How do they shape your view? 
①  Positively 
②  Negatively 
Survey on perception of foreign 
residents in Korea 
Q8. Have you ever been in direct contact with a 
foreign resident in Korea?  
①  Yes  ☞ Go to Q8-1  
②  No  ☞ Go to Q9  
 
Q8-1. How was your experience overall?  
①  Very positive 
②  A little positive 
③  Neutral 
④  A little negative 
⑤  Very negative 
 
Q9. Which of the following group do you consider to be 
“more Korean”?  
a) A foreign national with Korean heritage  
(e.g. famous golfer Lydia Ko) 
b) A naturalized Korean citizen of foreign origin  
(e.g. table tennis player Jihee Jeon, Yeseo Tang) 
① a) 
② b) 
③ a) and b) are both equally Korean 
④ Neither a) nor b) is Korean 
 
Q10. Suppose the following groups of people are 
immigrating to Korea. Please rate your preference.  
(1=Very favorable, 6=Not favorable at all)  
Occupation 
 
Origin 
Manual 
laborer 
Investor 
Foreign 
bride 
Eastern Europe 
 
   
Southeast Asia 
 
   
China 
 
   
 
Q11. Are you currently volunteering or making a donation?  
①  Yes 
②  No 
 
Q12. Rate your satisfaction with life  
(0: Extremely dissatisfied - 100: Extremely satisfied) 
____________________% 
 
 
Demographic Questions◀ 
 
sq1. Region 
① Seoul  ② Busan ③ Daegu  ④ Incheon ⑤ Gwangju ⑥ Daejeon 
⑦ Ulsan ⑧ Sejong ⑨ Gyeonggi ⑩ Gangwon ⑪ Chungbuk ⑫ Chungnam 
⑬ Jeonbuk ⑭ Jeonnam ⑮ Gyeongbuk  ○16  Gyeongnam ○17  Jeju    
sq2. Gender  Male   Female 
  
sq3. Age 
 
Years old 
  
 
 
 sq4. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
① Less than middle school 
② High School 
③ College or above 
 
sq5. What describes your current employment status best? 
① Employed 
② Seeking for job 
③ Retired/Housewife 
④ Student 
⑤ Unemployed 
 
sq6. What is your average monthly household income? 
* Please include the bonus and other source of income. 
① Below KRW 1,000,000 
② Above KRW 1,000,000 up to KRW 2,000,000 
③ Above KRW 2,000,000 up to KRW 3,000,000 
④ Above KRW 3,000,000 up to KRW 4,000,000 
⑤ Above KRW 4,000,000 up to KRW 5,000,000 
⑥ Above KRW 5,000,000 
 
sq7. Do you have a religion? If so, how do you identify yourself? 
① No religion                             ☞ End of survey 
② Protestant                                ☞ Go to sq7-1 
③ Catholic                                   ☞ Go to sq7-1 
④ Buddhist                                  ☞ Go to sq7-1 
⑤ Other: ________________  ☞ Go to sq7-1 
 
sq7-1. Do you consider yourself more religious than others and try to follow doctrines?  
①  Very much 
②  A little 
③  Average 
④  Not quite 
⑤ Not at all
 
 
⋇ Thank you for your participation. 
Other Demographic Questions 
Appendix2: Sample Summary Statistics 
Demographic information 
sq1. region Frequency Percentage Accumulated (%) 
 ① Seoul 200 20.0 20.0 
② Busan 72 7.2 27.2 
③ Daegu 52 5.2 32.4 
④ Incheon 57 5.7 38.1 
⑤ Gwangu 29 2.9 41.0 
⑥ Daejeon 34 3.4 44.4 
⑦ Ulsan 23 2.3 46.7 
⑧ Sejong 3 .3 47.0 
⑨ Gyeonggi 218 21.8 68.8 
⑩ Gangwon 32 3.2 72.0 
⑪ Chungbuk 32 3.2 75.2 
⑫ Chungnam 40 4.0 79.2 
⑬ Jeonbuk 36 3.6 82.8 
⑭ Jeonnam 39 3.9 86.7 
⑮ Gyeongbuk 58 5.8 92.5 
⑯ Gyeongnam 63 6.3 98.8 
⑰ Jeju 12 1.2 100.0 
Total 1000 100.0   
sq2. gender 
 
 ① Male 504 50.4 50.4 
② Female 496 49.6 100.0 
Total 1000 100.0   
sq3. age 
 
 ① 20’s 178 17.8 17.8 
② 30’s 202 20.2 38.0 
③ 40’s 218 21.8 59.8 
④ 50’s 188 18.8 78.6 
⑤ 60 or above 214 21.4 100.0 
Total 1000 100.0   
 
 
 
sq4. education level Frequency Percentage Accumulated (%) 
 ① Middle school 
or less 
100 10.0 10.0 
② High school 266 26.6 36.6 
③ University or 
above 
614 61.4 98.0 
Didn’t respond 20 2.0 100.0 
Total 1000 100.0   
sq5. employment 
status  
 ① Employed 623 62.3 62.3 
② Job searching 15 1.5 63.8 
③Retiree 
   /Housewife 
215 21.5 85.3 
④ Student 71 7.1 92.4 
⑤ Unemployed 73 7.3 99.7 
Didn’t respond 3 .3 100.0 
Total 1000 100.0   
sq6. income  
(1,000 KRW)  
 ① Under 1000 76 7.6 7.6 
② ~ Up to 2000 72 7.2 14.8 
③ ~ Up to 3000 129 12.9 27.7 
④ ~ Up to 4000 178 17.8 45.5 
⑤ ~ Up to 5000 141 14.1 59.6 
⑥ More than 5000 283 28.3 87.9 
Didn’t respond 121 12.1 100.0 
Total 1000 100.0   
 sq7. religion 
 
 ① No religion 509 50.9 50.9 
② Protestant 226 22.6 73.5 
③ Catholic 114 11.4 84.9 
④ Buddhist 147 14.7 99.6 
⑤ Other 4 .4 100.0 
Total 1000 100.0   
 
 
sq7-1. Do you consider yourself to be more religious and try to follow religious doctrines?   
Religiosity Frequency Percentage Accumulated (%) 
 ① Strongly agree 15 1.5 3.1 
② Agree 59 5.9 15.1 
③ Neither agree nor 
disagree 
216 21.6 59.1 
④ Disagree 114 11.4 82.3 
⑤ Strongly disagree 87 8.7 100.0 
Total 491 49.1   
  - No religion 509 50.9   
Total 1000 100.0   
 
 
Frequency distribution for main questions 
Q1. How is your view on foreign residents in Korea? 
  Frequency Percentage Accumulated (%) 
 ① Very 
favorable 
79 7.9 7.9 
② Favorable 335 33.5 41.4 
   ①+② 
Favorable 
414 41.4   
③ Neither 
favorable nor 
unfavorable 
482 48.2 89.6 
   ④+⑤ 
Unfavorable 
104 10.4   
④ Unfavorable 80 8.0 97.6 
⑤ Very 
unfavorable 
24 2.4 100.0 
Total 1000 100.0   
 
 
 
 
Q1-1. What is the biggest reason behind your favorable view toward foreign residents? 
  
Frequency Percentage 
Accumulated 
(%) 
 ① New 
ideas and 
diversity 
135 13.5 32.6 
②Beneficial  
to economy 
179 17.9 75.8 
③ Mitigate 
demographic 
problems 
85 8.5 96.4 
④ Others 15 1.5 100.0 
Total 414 41.4   
  - Responded 
③+④+⑤  
in Q1              
(Neutral + 
Unfavorable) 
586 58.6   
Total 1000 100.0   
 
